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Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future
And time future contained in time past.
All time is unredeemable
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perp etual possibility
Only in a world ofspeculation.
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end which is always present.
T. S. Eliot
The first day of our political liberation is the




Independence and the future
Namibia will be independent with an African
government. The colonial economy [Green and
Kilj unen forthcoming; Barthold 1977; Murray,
Morris, Dugard and Rubin 1974], and the occupa-
tion regime [Kiijunen 1980] are in their death
throes. Only the exact timing, the degree of destruc-
tion before independence and the modalities of
transfer remain unclear. There is now a surge of
medium-term strategy designing, goal setting,
scenario writing about the political economy of an
independent Namibia - by SWAPO and by the UN
family [SWAPO 1976a, b], by observers with no
stated preferences [Barthold 1977, USAID 1979],
by partisans both of radical change [Green 1980]
and cautious gradualism [Thomas 1978]. This is
inevitable and indeed desirable - at least so long as
Namibians take a lead in the process and in
scrutinising the products.2
However there is a danger in the often implicit
assumption that Namibia can move directly and
smoothly from her colonial past and chaotic
I While Dr Green has served as a consultant to the United
Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN) and to SWAPO's
economic secretariat, the views expressed are his personal
responsibility and are not necessarily those of UNIN or
S WA Po.
Z lt is useless to pretend that the USA can avoid having a policy
toward and preferences about Namibia or that 'economic
liberalism' will have no internal or external backers. Better that
the premises and scenarios be set out, published, open to ex-
amination and criticism.
present into long-term political economic develop-
ment. What happens in the first five or ten years
depends very much on what happens in the first six,
12 or 18 months. Over this period, severe con-
straints, both physical and political will be felt.
Structural Inheritance3
The structural inheritance of Namibia is a contra-
dictory one. At over $1,250 per capita GDP, it is a
heritage of relatively adequate productive forces. Its
two critical sources of foreign exchange - gem
diamonds and uranium oxide - have good market
prospects; and there is no reason to suppose that
output need fall substantially in the short run. If
production can be maintained - and marketed -
foreign exchange and tax revenues should be among
the least of the new nation's worries. Exports are
about 70 per cent of GDP, surpluses (before tax) of
large firms are nearly as high - about $1,200 mn
and $1,050 mn respectively out of GDP of the
order ofSl,700 mnin 1979.
But that sums up the positive side of the structural
inheritance. The production mix is a virtually
perfect example of an economy which produces
what it does not use and uses what it does not
produce. Ninety per cent of physical production is
exported - 100 per cent for diamonds, minerals and
karakul (which account for over 50 per cent of total
and 70 per cent of non-service GDP); 90 per cent
for cattle; almost 50 per cent for manufacturing
(basically meat packing and fish processing).
Beyond meat, milk and tinned fish Namibia is now
self sufficient in nothing. Even 50 per cent of staple
grain is imported in good years.
Personal income distribution is virtually on race
lines. In 1979 the average European household
income was of the order of$ 141 5,000, and average
African income $700. The urban poverty line data
suggested $1,800 as the minimum necessary house-
hold income [Cronje, G. and S. 1979 ch 5]. Of an
economically active population of over 500,000 in
1977, about 475,000 were African (including
Coloured'). But of that 475,000, 240,000 were in
pseudo-subsistence agriculture (two per cent of
For more detailed data see Green, 1979; UNIN 1978 and - from
a somewhat less critical stance - Thomas 1978.
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GDP) and another 75,000 or so in domestic service
(19 per cent of GDP). Per contrq, of admin-
istrators, proprietors, professional/technical/para-
professional occupations, 20,000 of 27,000 were
European and almost 5,000 of the Africans were
primary school teachers and nurses.
The currency is the Rand; the banks - with a minor
exception - are branches of South African units.
The key operating companies are transnational
corporations. One - Anglo American - engrosses
diamonds, a chunk of base metals, fish processing
and export, much of karakul export and a mélange
of subsidiary activities. RTZ, Amax-Newmont,
Falconbridge (mining) and the South African state
(cattle marketing, railwaysharbourstelecom-
munications, much rail transport, power and water,
a dominant interest in several mines and co-
domination with RTZ of Rossing) round off the
'gang of five' (or nine adding in Standard and
Barclays, Shell and BP) which dominate productive
activity. Very few enterprises in Namibia are com-
plete: it has not been treated as a territorial
economy but as a corner of South Africa where it
was convenient to carry on some aspects of South
African business. CDM's diamond sorting and
valuing, the main Railway workshops, Tsumeb's
(Amax-Newmont's) copper refinery, the processing
and auction of karakul pelts - all are located in the
Republic.
Exports (apart from uranium oxide and some base
metals) are largely through the Republic and are
handled by South African-based firms. Eighty per
cent of cattle are sold to the Republic as live beasts.
This may help the railway and South African
packing plants, but is hardly cost efficient or a base
from which to shift markets. Imports are 90 per
cent through and 70 per cent from the Republic; for
maize and petroleum products as well as coal and
mining machinery, locating alternative sources
promptly is likely to be difficult. This is hardly
alleviated by the fact that importing is a preserve of
South African-based firms.
The patterns of services and of infrastructure are as
distorted as personal income. There is no usable
national language at present - the Boers' conduct
has ruled out Afrikaans, English, 'the language of
freedom', is not widely spoken, no Namibian
language is broadly national. African education is
deplorable in quantity (especially beyond primary)
and quality, as are African health services. Produc-
tive services - eg agricultural planning and exten-
sion - are virtually 'for whites only'. Of 35,000
boreholes 34,500 are in European, 500 in African
areas. There is, however, an all-weather road
network in African areas - to allow the army to
move to combat liberation forces. There is also a
good vaccination service for African cattle - to
ensure that they are not reservoirs of contagion for
the European ranches.
History and the Future
These facts might seem to suggest a need for
'gradualism' - an attempt to repeat the past
colonial history of Kenya, with South Africa in the
role of the UK and SWAPO (or some 'responsible'
substitute) in the role of KANU. At least one
seriously argued treatise makes the case for such a
strategy [Thomas 1978]. But there is no such
option.
The colonial history of Namibia is one of theft -
theft of sovereignty, of land, of residence and labour
rights [Clarence-Smith and Moorson 1975; Segal
and First 1967]. The 'choice' given to Namibians
has been to work on white terms or to starve. The
Africans have been herded into reserves which can-
not provide subsistence but can provide places for
families to stay and scratch out some food and
shelter. Combined with the single migrant worker
'contract' system, they have allowed payment of
sub-subsistance wages and have corroded African
households and societies. They have also forged a
unity of workers and peasants (most adult male
Namibians have been both), provided mobilising
grounds in the prison-like compounds for 'con-
tract' workers (into which police now dare go only
in riot squad strength), created a worker conscious-
ness which is also a national consciousness, built in
the raison d'être and provided the initial organising
and recruiting grounds for the Liberation Move-
ment [Cronje 1979: ch V; South African Labour
Bulletin, 1978; 4-1, 2].
Similarly, except in the north and north-east, 90
per cent of the usable land is in 6,500 or so Euro-
pean ranches. Their average income is perhaps
$30,000 gross and $15,000 net. They employ an
average of about 10 Africans (at least half of whom
are men separated from their families and/or
seasonally employed) paid perhaps $350 a year
including payment in kind.
Three key mines - Rossing (uranium), Oamites
(copper) and Otjihase (copper) - date from since
1966 when the Mandate was revoked. In terms of
the 1971 World Court ruling, these constitute not
mines with lawful mineral rights but - quite
literally - grand larceny, and purchase from them
can be interpreted as 'recieving' within the meaning
of the law.4.
While more cautiously worded this is the conclusion of
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1978.
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The history of repression, of trickery, of violence
- from the German wars of reconquest which gave
the world the term genocide, to the virtually
equally brutal South African battle to regain the
illegally occupied territory - has left an indelible
set of constraints. 'Moderation' is no longer a
marketable product in Namibia.
SWAPO's programmes give some indication of
the historically and politically possible. They are
adamant on principles and goals:
transition to a socialist mode of production -
im mediate nationalisation of land, mineral and
fishing rights, of South African state property
and of illegally acquired assets. Joint ventures
and TNC operations to operate within a
¡'Ta mib ian framework.
Land to the tillers. The abolition of all forms of
exploitation of man by man . . . and aggran-
disment of wealth and power by individuals,
groups or classes. Greater equality - including
universal access to basic health and education
and to pure water. Opportunities for full pro-
ductive employment.
Abolition of 'contract' labour, child labour,
'humiliating servant systems'. Right of workers
to organise and to have an effective voice in all
decisions directly affecting them.
Sever all relations with the South African racist
regime until there is a democratic government
in that country based on the principles of
majority rule. [SWAPO 19761.
The ideology underlying the programme is spelled
out by Kiljunen in this Bulletin. But while the
principles are firm, as is the sense of urgency, care-
ful reading (and talking to SWAPO cadres) suggests
a genuine perception of the structural constraints
and acceptance of the need to set priorities and use
flexibility in tactics. Joint ventures, not loo per
cent nationalisation, are envisaged; the severance
of relations with South Africa is not seen as an
overnight event but as a process. There is no incli-
nation to seek autarchy; the need for a consider-
able corps of expatriates (acceptable to and largely
chosen by Namibia) is recognised; the problems of
training, providing basic services and altering insti-
tutional patterns are not glossed over. The pro-
grammes are radical but, unlike 'gradualism, they
are also potentially realistic.
Constraints on Policy
Nambia does have a relatively high achieved level
of productive forces. It also has the potential for
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increasing and altering the composition of its Gross
Domestic Product. Because of present inequalities
and the absence of an entrenched African elite, it
has a remarkably high potential surplus for recon-
struction and development investment, for pro-
ductive services (eg education, health, pure water),
for meeting urgent social requirements (eg the
housing and urban infrastructure requirements of
'ending contract' and reuniting African families at
workplaces). But it also inherits a very fragile set of
structures, a great danger of things going wrong, a
very hard and unforgiving set of constraints.
Namibia's ecology is fragile [Wellington 1955;
FAO 1977]. Failure to rotate herds, overstocking,
breakdown of boreholes can all quickly lead to
rapid and potentially irreversible degradation of
grass, to errosion and desertification. As the fishing
industry has been devastated [Africa Contemporary
Record 1977-78 and 1978-79; The Star 1978], so
could the ranching sector go - and without the same
capacity for revival after a moderate 'rest period'.
The technology of the core of the economy -
mining, ranching, urban water supply - has little
tolerance for error. Misuse of machinery and failure
either to enforce or educate workers to internalise
safety codes would not merely (and disastrously)
reduce GDP, exports and surplus. It could also kill
people. Mozambique knows that to its cost from
experience in coal. Ranching in Namibia is cen-
trally planned in detail - land use, water supply,
rotation of grazing [Nixon 1978]. There is little
tolerance in the nature of the ecology for trial and
error. Windhoek depends for much of its urban
water on purified sewage run through one of the
world's most technically sophisticated plants. A
small error could mean a full-scale cholera epi-
demic throughout the urban area in which up to
one fifth of the nation's people live.
The production mix is not - in the short run -
malleable nor are its end uses. Gem diamonds,
uranium oxide, copper-lead-zinc, karakul, levels of
meat or fish even approaching those now achieved
can be consumed only by export. (Meat and fish
production is of the order of 2 kg per day per man,
woman, child and infant.) They must be marketed
effectively or the potential surplus will be lost, and
the bulk of wage employment and rural incomes
put in grave jeopardy. Equally both present prod-
uction and investment to alter it - not least in
irrigation to build up food production - are heavily
dependent on imports. Indeed, without basic food
and fuel imports Namibians would starve; no
retreat to pure subsistence is possible in much of
the country.
The personnel structure is equally hard to alter.
Skill requirements cannot be reduced radically.
The ecology, technology and production mix set
stark constraints - as do the new requirements of
independence. Because of the history of Namibia
many posts must be expatriate for a time. The pro-
jected requirement of 15,000 is daunting absolutely
but, as a cut from 36,500 economically active Euro-
peans today, it is a daunting challenge too [UNIN
1978]. Moreover, many of the present Europeans
will not be welcome or indeed willing to stay for
more than the briefest of periods.
Namibia's history is equally unforgiving. The
political ecomomy of theft, of blood and iron, of
fire and the sword means that radical changes must
be made and be seen to be made rapidly. There is
no longer any room for gradualism on land and
mineral rights, nationalisation, on limiting (and
being seen to limit) the power of TNCs, on ending
the migrant labour system, on making rapid pro-
gress in raising African incomes, on placing Nami-
bians in key posts.
Lastly the geographic location - or geopolitical
setting - is hostile and unforgiving. South Africa is
a neighbour with many kinds of residual leverage.
Not least of these are its claims to Walvis Bay and
the fact that the critical diamond industry will be
within the range of South African guns on the other
side of the Orange River estuary. Nor can one
suppose that there will be much real understanding,
let alone mutual respect between the two states.
A Checklist of Priorities
In the initial year of independence there will be a
need to allocate energy, attention, resources to what
is immediately essential. Most of what is merely
desirable will have to be postponed. What are the
key items?
- Keeping mineral production going - notably in
diamonds, uranium, and the main copper-
lead-zinc mines. This is the backbone of govern-
ment revenue, export earnings and investable
surplus. Its output is readily saleable - and for
diamonds and uranium oxide readily exportable
by air. The mineral TNCs are used to being
forced to renegotiate historic unequal contracts.
There are alternative operators to be had if exist-
ing companies will not accept reasonable new
arrangements.
- Ranching is the heart of rural production.
Together with mining, it is critical to employ-
ment. It is likely to be hit by cattle exodus or
killing - unless perhaps SWAPO publicly agrees
to pay market value for cattle and created assets
which are turned over in good order, and to
prosecute for sabotage. 1f the industry is in
reasonable working order, it will face marketing
problems; more packing facilities (or possibly
cattle boats to the Middle East) and new markets
will be needed.
- It is only too evident that the fishing fleet will be
in Table Bay, not Walvis Bay, on the day the
latter becomes Namibian. To save jobs in the
processing industry, contract fishing, training for
skippers, boat building (abroad and at the Walvis
bay base) are urgent necessities. So are conserva-
tion measures inshore and to a 200 mile limit to
allow restoration of fish stocks (see above).
- Additions to basic services will be required. An
acceptable national language (presumably Eng-
lish) must be taught. Adult education - especially
rough and ready gap filling and upgrading
courses - must have top priority so that the
number of expatriates can be rapidly reduced
from 36,500 to 15,000. The ground must be laid
for radical expansion of the educational system.
Health services - especially vaccination, health
education, preventive medicine, first aid - must
be made available nationally; these will build on
the experience of Zambia and Angola, and semi-
liberated' area clinics and first aid teams.
- With the end of contract labour, 100,000 families
will seek to be re-united at places of work. Most
will wish to move rapidly. The urban layout and
services as well as the construction (even on an
artisanal plus communal basis) of say the first
quarter of the homes needed during the first year
is a minimum requirement to retain credibility
and to avoid the instant creation of permanent
urban slums to replace the prison compound and
shack pattern.
- Personnel must be mobilised more vigorously
and allocated more carefully than any other
resource. Every Namibian with a special skill is a
scarce asset. Namibians must hold and be seen to
hold power. Not to do so would render land
reform unacceptable no matter how technically
desirable it might be as a first step. Use of expert
technical support teams, each servicing a score of
ranches with Namibian production level man-
agement, might be feasible. But expatriates in a
wide range of positions will be needed and will
have to be identified, recruited, supervised - and
promptly fired if unsuitable.
- Income distribution will pose problems. African
wages and salaries must be raised, but not to
75
present European levels (which Namibia could
not afford). Because separate scales by race must
be ended - a different thing from separate scales
for expatriates - a dilemma will exist in respect of
would-be citizens of European ancestry. It will be
necessary to raise agricultural incomes (by re-
distribution in ranching and by initial measures
to raise productivity and prices for field crops) to
avert a wholesale rural exodus and to aoid a
huge urban/rural income gap.
- The public sector will need to be large, quick on
its feet and business-like. It must be dominant in
finance (beginning with a central bank) and
external trade (beginning with marketing,
ranching and fishing products and organising
critical imports). It will also need to encompass
ex-South African statal/parastatal production
units and any other key enterprises whose ex-
owners have been expelled or who have aban-
doned them (including probably at least one of
the major post-1966 mines). All this will require
the creation of Namibian controlled institutions,
even if these have to be staffed initially by
expatriate technical agents.
To What End?
This analysis of the short-term challenges of politi-
cal independence is not a counsel for 'moderation',
'gradualism' or 'pragmatism'. Such a tactical
approach would almost certainly fail to meet the
challenges and destroy the political capital of any
leadership which sought to follow it. Nor is it a plea
for a return to a quasi-traditional way of life as a
new starting point. Namibia never was Arcadia;
any attempt to go back to 'before the Germans
came' would be suicidal. But nor is it a counsel of
despair. Namibia has degrees of freedom. It has a
people united as well as deprived by its history, a
leadership and cadres used to the long haul and the
hard slog of the liberation struggle. The appropriate
approach may be that of Antonio Gramsci: 'pessi-
mism of the intellect, optimism of the will'.
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